Broken market or broken policy? The unintended consequences of restrictive planning by Cheshire, Paul
  
Paul Cheshire 
Broken market or broken policy? The 
unintended consequences of restrictive 
planning 
 
Article (Accepted version) 
(Refereed) 
 
 
 
Original citation: Cheshire, Paul (2018) Broken market or broken policy? The unintended 
consequences of restrictive planning. National Institute Economic Review, 245 (1). R9-R19. ISSN 
0027-9501 
DOI: 10.1177/002795011824500111 
 
© 2018 SAGE 
 
This version available at: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/90240/ 
Available in LSE Research Online: September 2018 
 
LSE has developed LSE Research Online so that users may access research output of the School. 
Copyright © and Moral Rights for the papers on this site are retained by the individual authors and/or 
other copyright owners. Users may download and/or print one copy of any article(s) in LSE Research 
Online to facilitate their private study or for non-commercial research. You may not engage in further 
distribution of the material or use it for any profit-making activities or any commercial gain. You may 
freely distribute the URL (http://eprints.lse.ac.uk) of the LSE Research Online website.  
 
This document is the author’s final accepted version of the journal article. There may be differences 
between this version and the published version.  You are advised to consult the publisher’s version if 
you wish to cite from it. 
 
 
 
Broken market or broken policy? The unintended 
consequences of restrictive planning*  
 
Paul Cheshire 
London School of Economics &  
Centre for Economic Performance, Urban Programme: p.cheshire@lse.ac.uk 
 
Final text: 15th July 2018 
Abstract 
This paper summarises the evidence from recent research relating to the British 
Planning system’s impact on the supply of development. Planning serves important 
economic and social purposes but it is essential to distinguish between restricting 
development relative to demand in particular places to provide public goods and 
mitigate market failure in other ways, including ensuring the future ability of cities 
to expand and maintain a supply of public goods and infrastructure; and an absolute 
restriction on supply, raising prices of housing and other urban development 
generally. Evidence is presented that there are at least four separate mechanisms, 
inbuilt into the British system, which result in a systematic undersupply of land and 
space for both residential and commercial purposes and that these have had 
important effects on both our housing market and the wider economy and on 
welfare more widely defined. 
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Broken market or broken policy? The unintended consequences of 
restrictive planning 
by Paul Cheshire, Professor of Economic Geography, London School of Economics 
1. Introduction: why we need land use regulation 
Planning – regulating land use - is very valuable from both an economic and a social 
viewpoint. Land markets have endemic problems of ‘market failure’ meaning that 
unregulated they would serve neither the economy nor society well. The value of 
every parcel of land depends on the uses on all neighbouring plots of land: the 
spatial extent of these interactions can be very extensive. The occupants of a plot of 
land will suffer if a lead smelter sets up business next door so the value that can be 
derived from their plot will fall. That is a pure localised negative externality so 
represents not just an issue of market failure but justifies regulating the uses that any 
land can be put to. For example it might justify zoning. But these type of externalities 
can operate over long distances too: in the days of Concord lecturing had to stop for 
five minutes every morning at the University of Reading as the New York flight flew 
overhead and accelerated to its cruising height. Heathrow is 35 kms east of Reading.  
Equally the value of a plot of land in Reading increases if job prospects in central 
London improve. 
An important reason London is so liveable is its abundance of beautiful green open 
spaces or areas of accessible natural beauty on its doorstep such as the North Downs. 
The welfare of all city residents increases because of urban green spaces and 
numerous studies have shown that access to urban green spaces is reflected in the 
price of houses (see for example Cheshire and Sheppard, 1995 or Anderson and 
West, 2006). Open spaces and beautiful countryside are ‘public goods’ – markets will 
not, or will inadequately, provide them because prices are not charged so there is no 
revenue, or land owners are rewarded too little, for the public benefits urban parks 
or  beautiful countryside can generate – especially when it is accessible to enjoy.   
Equally we need rules governing the provision of infrastructure – standards for 
roads for example or for provision for pedestrians and cyclists in new development. 
And we need to co-ordinate the provision of infrastructure – typically paid for, or at 
least initiated and planned by government – with new urbanisation.  
So as a society we benefit from not allowing land owners to build anything, 
anywhere. We need to regulate and plan land use. We need rules to govern where 
and how building is allowed and co-ordinate public investment with urban 
development.  
 
  
2. Risk, uncertainty and the supply of development 
This brings us to the first problem with the British planning system: it has no rules. 
We do have building regulations. These are rules. A builder or architect reads them 
and if their design and construction conforms to them, they can go ahead more or less 
automatically. Not so with planning: all decisions are subject to the uncertain and 
gameable mechanism of ‘development control’: decisions are made by a local political 
committee and this is subject to lobbying and political expediency. As is explained in 
Section 7 we have inbuilt institutional structures and fiscal incentives to enable and 
motivate restrictiveness. A proposal may conform to the local plan – if there is one – 
but if it is in the ward of the committee chair it may still be refused. Or even worse, a 
member may live across the road from the proposed development and does not want 
it1.  
 
Other planning systems work according to rules – for example the Master Planning 
system of Denmark or Germany or the US Zoning system. The result is that a 
significant element of uncertainty in the development process is all but eliminated. 
The developer reads the (democratically adopted) plan relevant for the plot of land 
which they wish to develop and asks for what is allowed. Permission is all but 
automatic.  
Development everywhere is a risky business: there are costs in the design, planning 
and construction process incurred before any revenues flow. Design and 
construction costs are relatively easy to forecast but in the British system the costs of 
obtaining planning permission, even the probability of gaining it at all, are not. It is 
difficult – particularly for smaller developers – to arrange financing before planning 
permission is agreed and a scheme’s details are clear: and no planning permission 
may be forthcoming. After the costs of design, planning and construction have been 
                                                 
11 Two examples: Eric Pickles when the ultimate (political) decision maker in the planning system told 
the story to the 2014 Housing Market Intelligence Conference of one of his first decisions as incoming 
Secretary of State (SoS) at the DCLG. It was to adjudicate on an appeal against rejection of a proposed 
medium scale housing development in London. The proposal appeared to conform to the local plan 
but had been rejected by the local planning committee and then again turned down on appeal. On 
asking his officials why it had been rejected when it seemed both to conform to planning requirements, 
to be needed and perfectly reasonable in scale, he was told it was in the ward of the chair of the planning 
committee and, although the Council wanted it passed, the chair did not want to ruffle the feathers of 
local voters. So it was rejected in the belief it would win on appeal. Unfortunately this did not happen 
so 5 years later it had landed on the desk of the SoS – who approved it. Or a small domestic case of an 
Islington resident who unexpectedly had twins and wanted to convert her attic into living 
accommodation. She was herself a planner and consulted the local planning department on the design 
and after some adjustments was assured there should be no trouble getting permission. Unfortunately 
a member of the committee lived opposite, had already converted his attic to living space and did not 
want to be overlooked.  The proposal was rejected and, following advice, revised and again rejected; 
then appealed and rejected. Her twins are now at school. 
  
paid there is an expected flow of revenues from the finished development with the 
value of that flow influenced by the conditions of any planning permission obtained. 
Development is an investment. Three consequences follow from this observation. 
The first has been addressed in the literature (see, for example, Cheshire and 
Sheppard, 1989; or Barker, 2003 pg. 158; Barker, 2006a, pg. 55-66) and is the costs 
imposed by delays in reaching decisions including time potentially taken in appeal. 
This causes financing costs to increase in proportion to delay so reduces the volume 
of development. As has been shown by Ball, 2011, the imposition of a target of 13 
weeks for decision making had little impact: the main effect seemed to be to increase 
the refusal rate leading to multiple applications for a given site. While government 
could claim that ‘nearly 70 percent of applications were processed within 13 weeks’ 
(Ball, 2011, pg. 358) the actual median period in the planning process was 64 weeks. 
There are two further implications of the investment nature of development: both 
relate to uncertainty induced by the unknown length of time needed at the outset to 
get permission and the further uncertainty that permission will be obtained at all.  
The first is the fact that in the face of uncertainty and an irreversible decision to 
invest or not there is value attached to an option to delay: uncertainty may increase 
that value of delay (see, for example, Dixit and Pindyck, 1994). However in the 
present case the uncertainty is external to the development and the timing of the 
developer’s (investor’s) decision to invest is unlikely to influence the delay they face 
or the likelihood they will get permission; nor does a developer have any ability 
reliably to estimate the length of any delay. So the option to delay application to 
develop is not just difficult to exercise in this case but not of much value either2.  
But there is a second and more certain effect of the uncertainty contingent on the 
British use of a gameable and uncertain mechanism for making decisions about 
development. The development decision involves a discounting of expected cost and 
revenue flows and the rate at which they are discounted will incorporate a risk 
premium. More uncertainty in relation to the planning decision, increases the 
development risk, so there must be an additional risk premium.  
As shown in Mayo and Sheppard (2001) this means less development appears to be 
viable and fewer projects get built. In other words the elasticity of supply is reduced 
since for a given current or expected future price of, say houses, less development is 
viable. There is an additional and paradoxical effect of the specific mechanism 
applied to lever developers into including ‘affordable’ housing in new 
                                                 
2 Cheshire et al., 2018 investigated whether there was evidence supporting the exercise of real options 
in the English housing market in a rather different context – variation in the elasticity of local housing 
supply, house price volatility and housing vacancies – and did not find evidence to support it. 
  
developments; Section 106 Agreements which make planning permission contingent 
on ‘obligations’ to provide a proportion of affordable units in any development  
The paradox is that this mechanism extends to time necessary to obtain permission3 
and adds a further dimension of uncertainty to expected profitability, so further 
increasing development risk and further reducing the total number of houses built. 
The specific obligations that are imposed are the outcome of negotiations between 
Councils and developers but are not known until the Planning Committee meets and 
makes a decision. Even then such decisions are both negotiable and may be 
appealed. Since the extra risk imposed by S106 conditions is unknowable in advance, 
fewer projects are viable. This is a particular problem for smaller developers who 
have less access to planners and to internal finance. So by injecting yet more risk, our 
attempt to build affordable houses makes all houses less affordable because fewer 
get built. 
A successful planning system inevitably imposes local restrictions on building and 
land use. Otherwise it could not fulfil its basic function of, for example, protecting 
beautiful countryside, sensitive wildlife sites or historic townscapes. But we should 
distinguish between purely local restriction of development and policies that restrict 
development in aggregate compared to what is demanded: what one might call 
‘generic’ restrictiveness.  
The additional uncertainty the British planning system injects into the development 
process means that in effect our system has an inbuilt restrictive effect – it is 
‘generically’ restrictive. No one has been able to quantify the impact this has. Its sign 
is clear – prices for all types of buildings increase – but devising a methodology to 
estimate its effects is extremely challenging. 
 
3. Restrictions on the supply of space 
There are, however, more direct ways in which our planning system is ‘generically’ 
restrictive. Perhaps the most obvious is ‘urban growth boundaries’ – in Britain, 
Green Belts – preventing any building over great tracts of land. The total area of 
Green Belts is more than 1.4 times the extent of that of all urban development. 
London’s Green Belt extends from the North Sea to Aylesbury, it covers more than 
three times the area of the GLA, and its containment boundary has been in place 
since the late 1950s. Oxford’s Green Belt covers eight times the area of Oxford city. 
                                                 
3 “In around 45 per cent of cases… these [i.e. S106 Agreements] take more than six months to 
complete…” Barker, 2006b pg. 122. 
  
The Green Belt as implemented in 1955 was never intended to protect land from 
building for environmental or amenity reasons. It is called ‘green’ but this is 
essentially rhetorical. As the Minister for Housing and Local Government (Duncan 
Sandys) wrote: 
 “…even if…neither green nor particularly attractive scenically, the major function of the 
Greenbelt was…to stop further urban development”.  [quoted in Hall, 1975]  
That remains the function of Green Belts as confirmed in the National Planning Policy 
Framework (NPPF) (DCLG, 2012)4. Their purpose is to be empty spaces between cities, 
originally – London’s was the first – to protect the Home Counties from the 
encroachment of London and force urban expansion to jump over Surrey or 
Hertfordshire to Northants, Cambridgeshire or Hampshire. The fifth purpose 
identified in the NPPF makes explicit the aim of restricting the supply of land for 
urban development in order to try to force development onto ‘derelict and other urban 
land’. 
 
London Transport’s tube network was well established by 1939 and had had the 
effect as it was constructed of rendering the supply of land for London’s 
development highly elastic (see Cheshire et al., 2014). WWII froze further urban 
expansion and building had not resumed in a significant way when Green Belt 
boundaries were established in 1955. The result was that tube stations became 
marooned in pockets of fields that development had not reached and have remained 
in that frozen state. Google Earth shows examples around Northwood Hills, 
Stanmore or Fairlop stations – all within 30 minutes of central London. Modern 
extensions of London’s commuter rail system are going to isolate further and much 
bigger tracts of environmentally not very interesting but highly accessible land. All 
the stations on CrossRail – costing some £18billion – beyond the Green Belt 
boundary will make large areas of land highly accessible to some of the most 
productive and highly paid jobs in Europe. Because stations like Taplow, Iver, 
Langley, Harold Wood, Brentwood or Shenfield all have large areas of Green Belt 
land around them, or are entirely surrounded by Green Belt, however, nothing can 
                                                 
4 According to the NPPF (2012) the Green Belt serves five purposes: 1) check the unrestricted sprawl 
of large built-up areas; 2) prevent neighbouring towns merging into one another; 3) assist in 
safeguarding the countryside from encroachment; 4) preserve the setting and special character of 
historic towns; 5) assist in urban regeneration, by encouraging the recycling of derelict and other 
urban land. 
 
  
be built. The fact that the land may be used only for intensive arable, golf or horsey 
culture – or just more or less rural dereliction – is not relevant.5 
To this restriction on outward spread of cities we add height controls: again either 
directly – for example the Borough of Islington forbids all building of more than 7 
floors except in a small enclave fringing the City and even that was only permitted 
from 2007: or indirectly because of extensive Conservation areas or protected views. 
No building, for example, can block the view of St Pauls Cathedral in an 18km 
corridor extending to Richmond Park. St Pauls is a magnificent sight but this view – 
given air pollution and prevailing atmospheric conditions – is available for only a 
few days a year to a very small number of people.  
We know from several studies that urban conservation is a valuable public good (for 
example Koster and Rouwenthal, 2017): but one must consider its value relative to 
its costs; but these are never considered. The costs come in the form of higher prices 
for housing and office space in London and our other cities and as Ahlfeldt et al, 
(2017) show conservation seems to have declining marginal benefits. Conservation 
also imposes a burden of additional carbon emissions since insulation in old 
buildings –Listed or in Conservation Areas – is far worse than in modern buildings 
(see Hilber et. al., 2017, for evidence on this). The question is not whether the 
preservation of important historical buildings or picturesque city neighbourhoods is 
worthwhile; it is how much is worthwhile.*** 
4. Inbuilt restriction on land supply 
Our planning system imposes yet more restrictions on space and its useful 
adaptation. The method used to calculate how much land to allocate for housing has 
an inbuilt and cumulative restrictive effect on supply relative to demand. Planning 
allocates the supply of a scarce resource – land. Prices are determined by the 
interplay of supply with demand but we allocate land supply without regard to 
price. 
                                                 
5 The discussion here is only about the land and housing supply effects of Green Belt restrictions. 
They could also generate amenity effects which would yield welfare. Cheshire and Sheppard (1995) 
using data for 1984 found evidence that in Reading, in southern England, more Green Belt land 
neighbouring a house did increase its premium although using a larger sample but a similar 
methodology, no such premium was found in their later study using data for 1999/2000 (Cheshire and 
Sheppard, 2004). More recently Gibbons et al., 2014, using a much larger sample covering all of 
England, found a significant premium for houses entirely surrounded by Green Belt land but no 
premium for houses close to such land. Most recently a more detailed study by Koster and Zabihidan 
(2018), directly investigating the net welfare effects of Green Belt land, obtained a similar result – a 
premium for houses entirely surrounded by Green Belt land but none for those close to Green Belt 
boundaries – but a substantial net welfare loss associated with Green Belt land because of the effect 
on housing supply. 
  
Table 1: Population change and real house price growth in the GLA Area 
Period % Change Pop %Change Real House Prices 
1981-2011 +20.5 +227.6 
1951-1981 -16.9 +71.9 
1951-2011 +0.1 +463.2 
 
Our planning system allocates land supply for housing only on projections of local 
household numbers – the ‘numbers’ component of demand. But population increase 
has very little impact on the growth in demand for housing or housing space, so it 
has very little impact on its price.  The reality of this is illustrated in Table 1. 
Commentators claim the rise in house prices in London is because of population 
growth. It is true London’s population grew quite rapidly in the 30 years to 2011 – 
by 20.5 percent. Real house prices – that is removing the effects of general inflation – 
grew ten times more, however, by 227.6 percent. On the other hand London’s 
population in the previous 30 years shrank by 16.9 percent yet real house prices still 
grew by 71.9 percent. And over the whole period 1951 to 2011, London’s population 
hardly changed yet real house prices increased by getting on for 500 percent. 
Broadly house prices in London have doubled in real terms in every decade since we 
imposed our Green Belt and population growth has had very little to do with it. 
A rather more formal approach to estimating the relative impact of incomes and 
population on the demand for, and price of, houses was embodied in some work 
commissioned in April 1997 by the then DETR to model the effects on house prices 
of alternative policies for land release. This built on the methodology already 
established (Cheshire and Sheppard, 1997; 2002) for estimating the net welfare 
effects of planning policies. The methodology built up from an empirically estimated 
hedonic model of housing markets (Cheshire and Sheppard, 1995) and then an 
estimated structure of demand for housing attributes (Cheshire and Sheppard, 1998), 
including both space inside houses and in gardens around them, as well as the 
‘outputs’ of the planning system – represented as less industrial land in your 
neighbourhood, more accessible public space in parks etc. and more Green Belt land 
external to the city. These models were calibrated on individual house transactions 
and the reported incomes and socio-demographic characteristics of their occupants. 
It was thus based on detailed micro and spatial data and, given estimates of prices 
and incomes, it was possible to estimate both land and housing space consumption 
at alternative levels of income and household numbers. Equally, given values for 
those key variables (i.e. land supply, household numbers and incomes), one could 
use the model to simulate equilibrium house prices with the simulations based on 
observed behaviour of house buyers. 
  
 
At the time the work was commissioned there was policy concern following a Green 
Paper on population growth (HMSO, 1996) projecting an increase in household 
numbers of 4.4 million in England over the 25 years from 1991. So one remit of the 
study was to provide robust estimates for house prices of growing population, 
applying alternative land release assumptions. Following the Green Paper, the 
model’s horizons were set to 2016. Two simulations are noteworthy here. In both 
cases the assumption was made that land release policy would be as had then been 
recently announced: 60 percent of all new housing would be on ‘brownfield sites’. 
This was interpreted as 60 percent of new building being on land within the existing 
urban envelopes. The first simulation set the growth in household numbers at the 
projected rate and real incomes rising at their historic average. The second also set 
household number growth at the projected rate but set real incomes static at 1996 
levels. The second, in other words, more or less corresponded to the planning 
system’s methodology for land allocation. 
 
The outcome was that on this second set of assumptions - officially projected growth 
in household numbers but constant real incomes - real house prices were forecast to 
increase by 4.4 percent by 2016. In contrast, the first simulation, with the model set to 
assume both the forecast rate of household number growth and the historic mean 
annual income growth, showed real house prices increasing by 131.9 percent by 
2016. In other words, with restrictions on land availability (mild in comparison to the 
outturn proportion of all new building on brownfield land), household number 
growth made little difference to house prices but real income growth had a very 
substantial effect.  
 
Officials were sceptical about the extent of real house price growth the model 
forecast. The study (Cheshire et al., 2000) was never officially published because by 
the time it was finally signed off, a policy of urban densification had been adopted as 
well as the 60 percent brownfield target and it was feared that the results of the 
model ‘might be used by people critical of government policy’. However, as a 
postscript, the outturn increase in real house prices from 1996 to 2016 was some 125 
percent – well within the bounds of error in the model. 
 
To an economist this is not very surprising. The analysis of markets has been a core 
interest for more than 200 years. The basic determinants of demand are well 
understood.  Total demand increases with the size of the market (the total number of 
people wanting to buy); if tastes shift in favour of the good or service; and as income 
increases. We also know that the demand for some goods and services is much more 
sensitive to increasing income than is that for others and may be complementary (or 
a substitute) to the consumption of others.  
  
As people get richer one of the things they try to buy more of is ‘housing space’ and 
‘space in gardens’. As you get richer you do not want more beds, you want a 
bedroom each, bigger bedrooms, bathrooms or a separate kitchen and living room. 
Over the past two generations real incomes have increased threefold. Car ownership 
has increased 13-fold and – like it or not – the use of cars is complementary to the 
demand for space: cars owners want garages, off street parking and shops with 
parking around them.  
In other words the income elasticity of demand for space both inside houses and 
around them in gardens is strong. They are not just normal goods but positively 
superior ones. There are few estimates available for the income elasticity of demand 
for housing space but one (Cheshire and Sheppard, 1998) produced a value of about 
2:  the study’s separate estimates of income elasticity of demand for space i) inside 
houses and ii) in gardens were very similar. There are more recent estimates for the 
income elasticity of demand but for the composite good – ‘housing’. These are 
higher: Meen (2013) estimated a value of 2.7 and an OBR study (Auterson, 2014) 
gave a value of close to 3.  
So by far the most important driver of the increasing demand for housing and 
housing space is the increase in real incomes6. This directly increases the demand for 
housing space but also increases the consumption of goods complementary to 
housing space. In allocating land for housing, however, our planning system ignores 
both these forces altogether. It allocates land for housing only on the basis of 
projected growth in household numbers in the local area over a short – typically 5 
year – horizon. This is akin to designing planes while ignoring the laws of gravity.  
As well as blocking urban expansion with Green Belt boundaries, therefore, relative 
to rising demand we have been systematically restricting the supply of land for two 
generations because of the methods used to estimate how much is ‘needed’. 
5. Systematic differences in local restrictiveness 
Our planning system imposes a generic restriction on supply in yet another way. It 
just says no: local planning committees reject proposals for development. This again 
reflects the politicised mechanism of decision making we employ and the incentives 
for restrictiveness our fiscal system creates. A rejection may reflect local planning 
policies but very often it does not. That is partly because developers do not tend to 
apply for projects that flout local plans: but also because – as was discussed in 
                                                 
6 This is over the very long run: the more than 60 years since 1955. In the short and medium run (real) 
interest rates are of course important as an influence on demand but over the very long run real 
interest rates have not changed very much. In the period since 1955 they were at their lowest in the 
mid-1970s. In 1975 inflation was more than 24 percent with current interest rates a mere 11 percent. 
  
Section 2 – the reality is that rejections are essentially political and reflect local 
pressures. Over the whole period since 1989 the average refusal rates for major 
residential developments by Local Authorities (LAs) vary very widely from half of 
proposals refused in several LAs in the South East to only just over 7 percent in 
Middlesbrough. That half of proposals are refused by a given LA does not mean that 
half never get built. As was discussed in Section 2, one effect of greater local 
restrictiveness is multiple applications for the same site. This still delays and 
increase the cost of development and reduces the flow of new housing. 
Research has shown  (Hilber and Vermeulen, 2016) that ‘restrictiveness’ measured 
by the rate of planning applications refused – very carefully offsetting for obvious 
problems of reverse causality and endogeneity bias in estimating  – directly causes 
significant differences in house prices. These differences are far more significant than 
those caused by local land shortages generated by differences in topography or 
available developable land. The conclusion of this study was that if the average 
restrictiveness of LAs in the South East had been as low as the average in the North 
East, house prices in the South East would have been at least 25 percent lower. The 
other two local measures of land supply restriction – less developable land or less 
flat, easy to build land – made some difference to local house prices but their 
influence was dwarfed by differences in the political restrictiveness of local decision-
making. Even this estimate of 25 percent is a lower bound, however, since their 
analysis is based in 1974 by which time Hall et al (1973) had already published a 
study arguing that planning policies, notably containment, had been pushing up 
house prices. 
6. Other consequences of greater local restrictiveness 
A recent paper (Cheshire et al., 2018) has examined another effect of local 
restrictiveness, also measured as the proportion of major residential applications to 
which an LA says no: the impact on the proportion of empty homes and the distance 
workers with local jobs commute. Planners and NIMBY-pressure groups often argue 
that it is not necessary to allocate as much land – especially green field land – for 
housing because there are vacant homes7. 
                                                 
7For example the comparatively unrestrictive East Midlands region in their Regional Spatial 
Strategy argued: ‘The annual average housing provision reflects a number of factors… offset against 
that is an assumption that vacancies in the existing stock should be reduced by a half percent, which 
will bring 8,600 dwellings back into use.’ (ODPM, 2005, Appendix 4, p. 91). Or Simon Jenkins: “I 
will laugh in the face of those who claim that we must have ever more towers … I will do the same to 
those who demand an end to city conservation areas and green belts. There are thousands of houses and 
flats lying vacant in London and hundreds of acres awaiting renewal.” Evening Standard, April 11 
2017. 
 
  
Again there is a danger of ignoring the laws of gravity because they are 
inconvenient. However well a housing market is functioning there will be empty 
houses – people move or die; builders take time to sell or landlords are inefficient or 
unable to find tenants. It is rather like the labour market: it is desirable if there are 
fewer people unemployed but because people leave jobs to find better ones or lose 
their jobs, there are always some unemployed. The relevant questions are how many 
is enough and why are there empty houses/people looking for work. Without a 
diagnosis of causes, no policy can be expected to be effective. 
We know greater restrictiveness increases the price of housing (Hilber and 
Vermeulen, 2016). That will generate an incentive to sell homes or find tenants as 
soon as possible, so will produce a force reducing housing vacancies – as proponents 
of restrictiveness might hope.  
However, over time, greater restrictiveness will also make it harder to adjust the 
characteristics of the housing stock to the changing demand for housing. A local 
school improves, so demand for family houses in its catchment area increases; 
people become richer and want more space; families get smaller so the demand for 
suitable homes increases; or local jobs increase so people want to move to the area. 
The list is endless but the fact is that demand for housing is always changing both in 
terms of the type of housing and its attributes and the location of housing. The more 
difficult it is to adapt the characteristics of the housing stock the more difficult it 
becomes for people to find the right house they can afford. So they have to search for 
longer – meaning that housing vacancies will increase; or they have to search further 
afield – meaning their journey to work becomes longer and, because they do not buy 
locally, housing vacancies will be higher than they would otherwise have been. We 
can call this the ‘mismatch’ effect: created by greater restrictiveness and tending to 
increase the number of empty homes. 
So a policy of greater restrictiveness designed to reduce the number of empty homes 
may have that effect because it makes housing more expensive but since, at the same 
time, it makes it harder to find the ‘right’ house in the local area, it will tend to 
reduce the effectiveness of search and so increase the proportion of empty homes as 
well as increasing commuting distances. Which of these two forces dominates is an 
empirical question. More restrictiveness could go either way.  
This is the question addressed in Cheshire, et. al. (2018). The authors go to 
considerable lengths to deal with problems of reverse causation and endogeneity. 
There are 30 years of data for 350 English local authorities. The analysis shows with 
substantial reliability that the net effect of greater local restrictiveness is not just to 
increase the proportion of empty homes but to increase it substantially. A one 
standard deviation increase in local restrictiveness causes the local vacancy rate to 
  
increase by nearly a quarter. At the same time it also increases the average distance 
people with jobs in the LA have to travel to work. The same increase in local 
restrictiveness causes a 6.1% rise in commuting distances. 
So attempting to regulate housing vacancies away by allocating less land or being 
more restrictive with respect to new building or adaptation of existing houses, in 
reality increases the proportion of local homes that are empty as well making people 
who work in the area commute further: the absolute opposite of what advocates of 
the policy want to achieve. 
It is the mismatch between the preferences of households and the housing stock on 
offer that leads, other things equal, to higher vacancy rates in the more restrictive 
places. Such constraints will likely cause a significant welfare loss. This is because 
too much housing stays empty in the most regulated, most desirable and, by 
implication, most productive places with the strongest demand and highest 
valuations for living space. So people are induced to commute further, while living 
in the ‘wrong’ places. 
 
The policy lesson is that planners should not allocate less land for development on 
the grounds that there are empty houses; nor should they make it more difficult to 
build or adapt houses. Rather they should encourage more flexibility with the 
number, location and type of houses if they want fewer houses to be empty. 
 
There is moreover a disturbing irony for advocates of the ‘compact city’. In the UK 
the most common policy to attempt to implement this ideal is to impose Green Belts 
and so make land scarcer. Aiming for a compact city, in other words, makes 
planning policy more restrictive. 
 
Our results show this, too, will have exactly the opposite to the intended effect 
because average commuting distances will lengthen as residents search further away 
for housing that they can afford and which more closely matches their preferences. 
 
Figure 1: Changes in commuting to Inner London 2001 to 2011 by employed local 
residents: by Local Authority 
[Insert revised Figure 1 here] 
 
An even more general effect of Green Belts increasing commuting distances is 
suggested by Figure 1. This illustrates for LAs, changes in the proportion of the 
employed local residents commuting to jobs in Inner London between 2001 and 
2011. There was a reduction in commuting to Inner London from some LAs: the 
more negative/smaller was the increase the paler is the shading. Those areas with the 
largest rate of increase of commuting by their residents to Inner London are shaded 
the most darkly. The continuum from off-white to black represents an increasing 
  
commuter flow to Inner London. Most of London’s Green Belt and much of the 
South East shows small, even negative, growth. The strongest growth was 
systematically way beyond the Green Belt as far away as South Wales, Somerset, 
Bournemouth, Norfolk, even Yorkshire, as an increasing number of workers with 
jobs in London leapt across the Green Belt to find cheaper housing space but at the 
cost of maybe four hours commuting a day. These changes are often very small 
numbers – maybe the number of people went from just two to three: but in 
proportionate terms it reveals a sad, systematic and unintended consequence of the 
restrictions we impose on space for housing in the more prosperous areas of 
England around London where workers would be most productive.  
 
7. Incentivising and enabling restrictiveness 
There is not space to explore in detail in this paper the ways in which our 
institutional and fiscal system incentivises and enables NIMBYism. This is a rather 
different literature. However our highly centralised system of local government 
finance and property taxes ensure that local communities that permit development 
are financially penalised. In Cheshire and Hilber (2008) it was demonstrated that the 
move to Uniform Business Rates, by eliminating all tax revenues from commercial 
property from LAs and making that transparent, led to even more restrictiveness on 
the part of local planning committees. Because of revenue equalisation and the fact 
that most services funded by LAs are paid for out of block grants from central 
government, Council Tax receipts provide no fiscal incentive to permit development. 
There are statutory obligations on LAs to provide services but no transparent 
revenues flowing from accommodating more houses, to pay for them. Some efforts 
have been made in the past five years to improve this situation but they have been 
inadequate and the changes in incentives have been opaque. Government continues 
to urge LAs to be more permissive towards development while still in effect fining 
them for doing so.  
 
The situation in many other countries, especially those like Switzerland or Germany, 
with decentralised fiscal systems, is much more rewarding to communities which 
permit development. In Britain all that seems to happen if new houses are built in 
the community is that local roads and schools and social services become more 
congested. 
 
In addition, our governmental structure enhances the voice of voters who are 
exposed to the costs of development (short term disruption and congestion; longer 
term possible loss of amenities such as open space) but excludes the interests of 
those who might benefit from, for example, more affordable or better adapted local 
housing or more jobs. This is because, as was first argued in Cheshire et al., 1992, the 
spatial extent of the costs of development, while often significant for individuals, is 
very local while that of the benefits of development is spatially very extensive. The 
more locally political decisions relating to development are made, therefore, the 
  
more relative voice is given to restrictiveness. In addition, as with free trade, benefits 
of development are thinly spread over many, while costs are concentrated and 
significant for the few. 
 
The Abercrombie plan for London – 75 years ago - is arguably the first and last truly 
strategic plan for any major British city. That planned for the whole of the wider 
London region. In order that decisions on land release and development should give 
a balanced political weight to both the benefits and the costs of development, there 
needs to be strategic planning at the level of the City-Region or Functional Urban 
Area.  
 
8. Conclusions 
The evidence shows, then, that our planning system is restrictive in terms of the 
overall supply of land and housing space in the aggregate. It is not just locally 
restrictive in order to preserve land of significant environmental quality which in its 
unbuilt state generates amenity or has recreational value. Such purely local 
restrictions are likely to have positive welfare effects although the costs they impose 
also need to be taken into account.  Overall restrictiveness of supply relative to 
demand, in the absence of such environmental gains, does not increase welfare but 
does increase the price of housing relative to incomes, so reduces welfare, and has, 
as we have seen, unintended adverse consequences; for example on the length of 
commuting. 
 
Our planning system imposes this overall restrictiveness by means of at least four 
separate mechanisms. Its decision making is systemically restrictive because results 
of applications and conditions imposed for ‘affordable’ housing are unpredictable, 
so development risk is increased; it imposes quantitative restrictions on the supply 
of space (where it is most valued) by its imposition of Green Belts and height 
controls; its mechanism for deciding how much land to allocate for housing ignores 
the most important determinant of demand, so systematically undersupplies land; 
and there is substantial variation in local restrictiveness measured by the proportion 
of applications refused.  
 
Since all have the effect of reducing the supply of housing and other development 
relative to demand this drives up prices in real terms. Not only has this made 
housing increasingly unaffordable but it has had very regressive distributional 
effects, especially redistributing assets to older home owners. There are other 
unintended effects of more restrictive planning. A more restrictive pattern of local 
decisions on housing proposals causes a substantial increase over time in the 
proportion of local homes that are empty. Not only that but greater local 
restrictiveness significantly increases the average length of commutes for those 
working locally. There is also evidence consistent with Green Belts increasing 
commuting distances as workers leap frog out to buy less expensive housing space. 
  
This increases the spatial extent of cities even if it reduces the footprint of 
urbanisation. 
 
The extent of the price distortions induced by restrictions on the supply of land and 
housing mean that there is a misallocation of resources. Even in the US, where 
overall restrictiveness has historically been considerably less than in Britain, it has 
been estimated (Hseih and Moretti, 2017) that GDP would have been some 13.5 
percent higher had not restrictions on building slowed the flow of labour to the 
highest productivity locations over the period 1964 and 2009.   No similar estimates 
have been done for other countries. Cheshire et al. (2015), however,  did estimate that 
the loss of total factor productivity in the supermarket sector in England, as a result 
of forcing them to locate on particular sites in ‘town centres’, was 32 percent just 
between 1996 and 2008. Cheshire and Hilber (2008) estimated that the restriction on 
the supply of office space in British cities reached the equivalent of a tax on 
construction costs of 800 percent in London’s West End and even in less prosperous 
cities, such as Birmingham, averaged 250 percent:  there is certainly evidence that 
the economic effects of planning which is generically restrictive, can be large.  
 
To sum up there seem to be many reasons for concluding that our policies 
determining housing supply are broken but no obvious reason to conclude that the 
housing crisis results from a ‘broken housing market’.  
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